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Foreword
“States must protect against human rights abuse”. 
Thus begins the first of the UN’s Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, adopted unanimously by 
the Human Rights Council in June 2011. The adoption 
of the Guiding Principles represents a moment of glob-
al consensus that states must shape their trade and 
economic policy in a way that consistently protects 
human rights. They must take “appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress” human rights 
violations caused by economic activity. The Guiding 
Principles deal explicitly with international trade and 
investment agreements and make clear that states are 
expected to consistently fulfill their obligation to pro-
tect human rights across all these areas.
The Guiding Principles call on states not to enter trade 
or investment agreements that prevent them “from 
fully implementing new human rights legislation, or 
put them at risk of binding international arbitration if 
they do so.” The Guiding Principles caution states to 
reserve and maintain “adequate policy and regulatory 
ability to protect human rights under the terms of such 
agreements.” For European countries, this obligation 
extends to treaties negotiated and entered into by the 
European Union. 
This study by Lorand Bartels was commissioned joint-
ly by the German Institute for Human Rights and MISE-
REOR in order to consider the implications of these 
provisions in the Guiding Principles and to examine 
how they might be implemented in practice. Bartels 
examines the origins of the current human rights 
clause in EU trade and investment cooperation agree-
ments and its limited scope, which is chiefly concerned 
with revoking trade preferences in countries where 
serious violations of human rights or breakdown of 
democratic governance principles occur.
The study then goes on to examine ways in which it 
would be possible to revise the standard human rights 
clause to include negative consequences for human 
rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, 
as a result of the treaty itself. This is not a simple mat-
ter: Bartels acknowledges that documenting these 
types of human rights violations and attributing them 
to a trade or investment treaty is not easy. But even if 
it proves challenging in practice, Bartels reiterates that 
the Lisbon Treaty obligates the European Union to pro-
tect human rights in its external activities as well, and 
that the EU and its member states have committed to 
implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.
The German Institute for Human Rights and MISEREOR 
seek to present in the form of this study a proposal for 
the reworking and future development of human rights 
clauses in EU trade and investment agreements which 
will hopefully serve as a basis for wider discussion. 
Such discussions are always more fruitful against the 
background of a concrete reform proposal. For both 
organizations, the key question is how to improve the 
current toolkit in EU trade and investment treaties in 
such a way that the protection of human rights is 
strengthened rather than limited by the treaties them-
selves. 
We intend to pursue these proposals in national and 
European political processes over the coming months, 
and look forward to your comments and feedback on 
them and this study.
Dr. Bernd Bornhorst
MISEREOR 
Michael Windfuhr
German Institute for Human Rights
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Abstract
Since the early 1990s the EU’s international trade 
agreements have been governed by a human rights 
clause that permits one party to take ‘appropriate mea-
sures’ in the event that the other party violates an 
‘essential elements’ clause containing an obligation to 
comply with human rights and democratic principles. 
These clauses thereby permit the application of sanc-
tions in response to human rights violations. In prac-
tice, the EU has used these clauses to suspend finan-
cial aid to regimes following coups d’état or other 
politically motivated irregularities. 
The object of this study is to consider the extent to 
which these clauses also operate in a different scenar-
io, namely, to ensure that the implementation of the 
agreement itself does not prevent the parties from 
complying with their own human rights obligations. 
This is particularly important for the EU because, as 
the study shows, the Treaty on European Union requires 
that EU policies – including its trade policies – comply 
with human rights norms protecting persons in third 
countries. The study concludes that human rights 
clauses, as currently drafted, are inadequate to ensure 
that EU trade agreements will not inhibit the EU from 
complying with its human rights obligations. 
To remedy this situation, the study makes various rec-
ommendations for future EU trade agreements. The 
principal recommendations are that future agreements 
should contain:
 • a human rights exception permitting either party to 
suspend its trade obligations when this is necessary 
to comply with its obligations. 
 • a permanent human rights committee with a man-
date to consider the compliance of the parties with 
their human rights obligations under the agreement.
 • a mechanism for periodic human rights impact 
assessments.
 • a mechanism for civil society to bring complaints to 
the parties to initiate an investigation by the Euro-
pean Commission into human rights issues arising 
under the agreement.
Introduction
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1 
Introduction
Since 1995 the European Union has had a formal pol-
icy requiring all of its international trade and cooper-
ation agreements1 to be governed by2 a ‘human rights 
clause’. This clause gives each party a right to take 
‘appropriate measures’ in the event that the other par-
ty violates human rights or democratic principles. The 
EU has adhered to this policy with admirable consis-
tency, at times in the face of opposition. There are 
functioning human rights clauses in trade and coop-
eration agreements covering around 120 states.3 Most 
of these, and all recent agreements, are so-called 
‘mixed agreements’ concluded by the EU and its Mem-
ber States together.4
The wording of the human rights clause evolved dur-
ing the 1990s, and even now varies somewhat from 
agreement to agreement. The version of the clause in 
the Cotonou Agreement is particularly elaborate, and, 
uniquely, comes with an internal implementation 
mechanism. Nonetheless, it is possible to speak of a 
‘standard’ human rights clause, which comprises an 
‘essential elements’ clause setting out basic human 
rights and democracy standards, and a ‘non-execution’ 
clause setting out the mechanism for applying ‘appro-
priate measures’ in the event that an ‘essential ele-
ment’ of the agreement has been violated’. 
Compared to the wide range of situations in which 
they could be used, the EU’s human rights clauses have 
been applied in comparatively few types of cases. The 
clause can be invoked in any circumstances in which 
there is a violation of human rights or democratic prin-
ciples. However, the EU has only ever adopted ‘appro-
priate measures’ (usually a suspension of development 
aid) in response to coups d’état or significant deterio-
rations in a political situation.5 It is, in effect, seen as 
a political clause rather than as a human rights clause.6 
Indeed, it is rare that human rights per se are cited as 
a reason for the adoption of appropriate measures: the 
main trigger for their application is the violation of 
democratic principles and the rule of law.
It is not here suggested that appropriate measures 
should not be adopted in these politically inflected 
1 There are no human rights clauses on sectoral agreements on, for example, steel or fisheries. This omission was criticised in 
the European Parliament resolution on the human rights and democracy clause in European Union agreements [2006] OJ C 
290E/107, para 8.
2 The EU’s original policy required each new trade and cooperation agreement to contain an independent human rights clause: 
European Commission Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements 
between the Community and third countries, COM(95) 216. In 2009, it is understood that this policy was revised such that it 
is sufficient if the new agreement is governed by an existing human rights clause in a different agreement between the par-
ties. This policy is confidential, and the European Ombudsman is investigating the rejection of an application for disclosure: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st17/st17451.en12.pdf (retrieved on 5 February 2014).
3 Association agreements are free trade agreements. There is also a range of other free trade agreements, sometimes with a 
straightforward name (eg EU-Korea), but sometimes with names that are far from straightforward, such as the South Africa 
‘Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement’ or the EU-ACP ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’. Generally, ‘Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements’ provide for trade on a most-favoured-nation basis with non-WTO members, while ordinary 
‘cooperation’ agreements provide for cooperation, including financial cooperation, but not trade preferences.
4 These are generally cases of ‘false mixity’, where Member State involvement is legally unnecessary, but they wish to be 
involved for political reasons. For discussion of the implications of such mixity for the respective responsibilities of the EU 
and the EU Member States see Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: 
OUP, 2005), Ch 6.
5 Liisa Laakso et al, Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement, Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation No 6 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2007). More recent cases 
are similar. It should be noted that there are examples of non-political measures taken under development financing and 
autonomous trade instruments, such as the GSP Regulation. For a general overview, see Clara Portela, European Union Sanc-
tions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work (London: Routledge, 2010).
6 Remark by one senior European Commission official in private conversation.
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cases, nor is it the purpose of this paper to consider 
the consistency of the EU’s application of the clause 
in these circumstances. It is also not the purpose of 
this paper to discuss why the human rights clause has 
not been applied in a wider range of cases involving 
clear human rights abuses. Suffice it to say that there 
are many such cases. Rather, the purpose of this paper 
is to examine the extent to which, regardless of prac-
tice, the human rights clause can – and indeed must 
– be applied to a more limited set of human rights vio-
lations that result from the implementation of the free 
trade agreements in which they are contained. 
This paper begins with a history and analysis of the 
existing standard human rights clause. It next outlines 
the obligations of the EU and its Member States in 
relation to the human rights of persons in third coun-
tries. Third, it identifies the types of human rights vio-
lations that can result from the EU’s free trade agree-
ments. Finally, it proposes a new model human rights 
clause that can properly ensure that the EU and its 
Member States have the legal means to comply with 
their extraterritorial obligations. This model clause also 
contains various other improvements on the existing 
standard human rights clause, some of a technical 
nature, and some designed to facilitate the process of 
deciding on the taking of measures under the clause.
Evolution of EU human rights clauses
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2 
Evolution of EU human rights clauses
The EU’s human rights clause has its origins in the late 
1970s and 1980s, when the EU was faced with the 
apparent problem that it was bound by treaty obliga-
tions to continue supporting states that had commit-
ted serious human rights violations. The European 
Commission expressed this problem in the following 
way in an answer to a question from the European Par-
liament on whether it would suspend development aid 
to the Central African Empire following abuses in that 
country. It said: ‘the rebus sic stantibus clause [a rule 
of treaty law] could be invoked only when there had 
been a fundamental and unforeseeable change in the 
circumstances that existed when the treaty was con-
cluded.’7 It was to remedy this perceived situation that 
the EU initiated a policy of including human rights 
clauses in newly negotiated international agreements. 
At least for the EU, such clauses are still necessary 
today, except in cases in which compliance with such 
an obligation would violate a peremptory principle of 
international law (jus cogens), such as the prohibitions 
on genocide, slavery or apartheid.8
The first operative human rights clause was included 
in the 1990 EC-Argentina cooperation agreement, and 
stated as follows:
Cooperation ties between the Community and 
Argentina and this Agreement in its entirety are 
based on respect for the democratic principles and 
human rights which inspire the domestic and exter-
nal policies of the Community and Argentina.
It will be noticed that this clause does not actually 
commit the parties to comply with democratic princi-
ples or human rights. Rather, it states an assumption 
on which the continuing application of the agreement 
is based. This might seem peculiar, but it follows the 
logic of the Commission’s view, as seen in the above 
quoted answer to the Parliament. The idea was to cre-
ate, by means of a treaty clause, a set of circumstanc-
es that, if they changed, would enable the EU to invoke 
rebus sic stantibus. In fact, this was not a very sensible 
solution, because rebus sic stantibus is only available 
for situations that were unforeseen at the time the 
obligation was undertaken. A situation to which an 
agreement refers cannot, logically, have been unfore-
seen at that time.
It was probably for this reason that in the next round 
of agreements (beginning with Brazil) the EU added 
the phrase ‘and constitute an essential element of this 
agreement’ to the end of the clause. Most likely, the 
idea was to abandon rebus sic stantibus as a reason 
for suspension or termination, and rely instead on a 
different rule of treaty law, which allows the suspen-
sion or termination of a treaty when there has been a 
7 Written Question No 115/78 [1978] OJ C 199/27. In fact, the rule requires merely that the change has been unforeseen, not 
unforeseeable: Article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
8 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has said that human rights obligations always trump other treaty obliga-
tions: UN Human Rights Committee, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, Addendum – 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 
(19 December 2011), para 2.6. This statement must be treated with some caution. At most non-derogable human rights obli-
gations have the status of peremptory norms (jus cogens), and it is not immediately obvious why it is relevant that human 
rights treaties generate rights for individuals (indeed, so do investment treaties), while other treaties are based on reciproci-
ty. More can be said for the argument that Article 56 of the UN Charter contains binding human rights obligations that by 
virtue of Article 103 prevail over other treaties concluded by UN Members: see n 36. But even so, it would not be relevant to 
the EU, which as a non-UN Member is not bound by Article 103: Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) at 416. Indeed, as the EU has not assumed the functions of the Member States in the field, the EU would not 
even be bound under the internal EU doctrine of ‘functional succession’, applicable for example to the pre-1995 GATT 1947: 
cf Robert Schütze, ‘The “Succession Doctrine” and the European Union’ in Anthony Arnull et al (eds), A Constitutional Order 
of States? (Oxford: Hart, 2011). The decision of the EU Court of First Instance to opposite effect in Case T-315/01, Kadi I 
[2005] ECR II-3649 is logically inconsistent with the ECJ’s decision on appeal in Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, 
Kadi I [2008] ECR I-6351, even though it was not expressly overruled.
Evolution of EU human rights clauses
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‘violation of a provision essential to the accomplish-
ment of the object and purpose of the treaty’.9 In fact, 
this new attempt to draft a clause was barely more 
effective, because simply stating that a situation is an 
‘essential element’ does not create any obligation for 
the parties to make sure that that situation continues 
to exist. And without an obligation, there cannot be a 
‘violation’, which is necessary for this doctrine of trea-
ty law to apply. But, probably inadvertently, this ver-
sion of the clause was effective under a different, rar-
er, rule of treaty law, according to which a party can 
be considered to have repudiated a treaty by acting in 
a manner contrary to an assumption on which it is 
based.10
In any event, these problems are, at least to some 
extent, cured by the modern standard form of the 
clause, which adds a ‘non-execution’ clause, modelled 
on the EU’s standard safeguards clause,11 enabling 
either party to adopt ‘appropriate measures’ in the 
event that there is a violation of the ‘essential ele-
ments’ of the agreement.12 It is necessary to add the 
qualification ‘to some extent’, because technically the 
‘essential element’ described in the first clause is 
‘respect for human rights and democratic principles’, 
not the human rights and democratic principles them-
selves, and it is not clear how one can violate a noun. 
But despite the EU’s continuing failure to draft a clause 
properly, it is sufficiently clear what is intended, and 
the clause can be taken as having this intended effect.
There are also certain conditions on the application of 
appropriate measures. In keeping with the origins of 
the ‘non-execution’ clause as a safeguards clause, one 
condition is that ‘[in the] selection of measures, prior-
ity must be given to those which least disturb the func-
tioning of this agreement’.13 Another condition, which 
is not always included, is that the measures adopted 
must be in accordance with international law, must be 
proportionate, and that suspension is a measure of last 
resort. But so long as these conditions are complied 
with, where they are included, it is possible for the 
other party to take measures immediately, and in some 
cases this is not even subject to dispute settlement 
proceedings.
9 Article 60(3)(b) VCLT.
10 Article 60(3)(a) VCLT. For further explanation see Bartels, above n 4, at 104-6.
11 Safeguards clauses are an economic exception to free trade obligations that permit the adoption of measures in response to 
sudden surges of imports. They are discussed further below.
12 This also meant that Article 60 VCLT is not applicable to these clauses. Article 60(4) VCLT states that ‘[t]he foregoing para-
graphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach’. Oddly, with very few excep-
tions the legal commentary on these clauses misses this.
13 This clause makes little sense in the context of sanctions in response to ordinary human rights abuses committed by a state, 
because in such cases ‘appropriate measures’ are designed precisely to ‘disturb the agreement’. It makes more sense in the 
context of inadvertent human rights violations resulting from the implementation of a free trade agreement.
The adequacy of human rights clauses today
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3 
The adequacy of human rights clauses 
today
The ‘essential elements’ clause has been used as a basis 
for the establishment of a number of bilateral human 
rights subcommittees in some agreements, and a pro-
cess of political dialogue in the Cotonou Agreement. 
In addition, the ‘non-execution’ clause establishes a 
‘stick’, permitting a party to withdraw benefits provid-
ed under the agreement if the other violates human 
rights and democratic principles.14 As mentioned, there 
are some technical problems with the wording of the 
clauses, and some suggestions are made below on how 
to improve this wording. There are also certain 
improvements that can be made concerning the mech-
anisms for implementing the clause in terms of the 
Member States, and of other actors, such as the Euro-
pean Parliament and civil society. Nonetheless, in its 
basic outline the existing human rights clause serves 
its current function relatively well.
The question, however, is whether the human rights 
clause is equally adequate for the more recent prob-
lem – or, perhaps more accurately, more recently per-
ceived problem – that economic liberalization as 
effected by means of free trade agreements can result 
in violations of human rights, in particular economic 
and social rights. There are various complications asso-
ciated with such violations, including the difficulty of 
establishing violations and of allocating responsibility 
for the violation between the parties responsible for 
the liberalization; in particular, the state in which the 
violations occur bears the primary responsibility for 
complying with its own human rights obligations. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the EU and its Mem-
ber States bear responsibility in this regard, there is 
the possibility of such violations and that these viola-
tions result from obligations in a free trade agreement, 
there is a need for a human rights clause that will 
enable the EU and its Member States to comply with 
these obligations. The following discusses these issues 
in turn.
14 A great deal of emphasis is sometimes placed upon the ‘positive’ dimension of the human rights clause, which seems in 
practice to amount to the reinstatement of these benefits.
 Extraterritorial human rights obligations of the EU and its Member States
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4 
Extraterritorial human rights obligations 
of the EU and its Member States
The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 represented a watershed for 
the human rights obligations of the EU and its Mem-
ber States. It introduced into the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) concrete human rights obligations 
applicable to the EU’s external action, gave the status 
of primary law to the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms (the EU Charter), and provided 
for the EU’s future accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (the ECHR). It also continued, 
naturally, the existing human rights protections appli-
cable to the EU and its Member States, which draw on 
the European Convention and the constitutional tra-
ditions of the EU Member States. The following anal-
yses the extent to which these various sources of law 
require the EU and its Member States to respect, pro-
tect and fulfil human rights in third countries.
4.1 Articles 3(5) and 21 of the EU  
Treaty
The EU Treaty (TEU) sets out a number of overlapping 
obligations binding on the EU. Article 3(5) TEU states, 
firstly, that the EU ‘shall uphold and promote’ its val-
ues in its relations with the wider world. These values 
are described in Article 2 TEU as being ‘respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ The use of 
the word ‘shall’ indicates that the provision establish-
es obligations, and the nature of these obligations is 
spelled out by the words ‘uphold and promote’. Accord-
ingly, the EU has two distinct obligations: to ‘uphold’ 
these values and to ‘promote’ these values.
In addition, Article 3(5) states that, in its relations with 
the wider world, the EU ‘shall contribute to’ a range of 
additional values, listed as ‘peace, security, the sus-
tainable development of the Earth, solidarity and 
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as 
to the strict observance and the development of inter-
national law, including respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter’.
Article 3(5) TEU is reinforced by Article 21 TEU, which 
has several parts. Paragraph 1 states as follows:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall 
be guided by the principles which have inspired its 
own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter and internation-
al law.
It is not clear what the EU’s obligation to ‘be guided 
by’ the listed principles in its ‘action on the interna-
tional scene’ adds to its obligation to ‘uphold’ a slight-
ly different set of values ‘in its relations with the wid-
er world’. 
Paragraph 2 adds further obligations:
The Union shall define and pursue common policies 
and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, 
in order to:
(a)   safeguard its values, fundamental interests, 
security, independence and integrity; 
 (b)  consolidate and support democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the principles of inter-
national law;
(c)-(h) [various other objectives]
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This means, first, that the EU must pursue policies and 
actions directed at the objectives mentioned in the 
subparagraph. In other words, the EU must establish 
policies aimed at the ‘consolidation and support of 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the prin-
ciples of international law’. The EU’s policies to pro-
mote these values are accordingly not optional, but 
required by the EU Treaty. Second, the EU must ‘work 
for a high degree of cooperation’ to the same ends. 
This duty of cooperation is of key importance to the 
implementation of obligations with respect to extra-
territorial social and economic rights.
Paragraph 3 adds yet more. It states:
The Union shall respect the principles and pursue 
the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the 
development and implementation of the different 
areas of the Union’s external action covered by this 
Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union, and of the external 
aspects of its other policies.
This is a concrete obligation defined by the principles 
listed in paragraph 1 and the objectives listed in para-
graph 2. Again, it divides into two parts. 
First, it requires the EU to ‘respect’ the principles set 
out in paragraph 1, not just to be ‘guided’ by them, as 
stated in paragraph 1. It also has a broader scope. 
Paragraph 1 refers to ‘action on the international 
scene’. By contrast, paragraph 3 applies both to ‘the 
development and implementation of the different 
areas of the Union’s external action’ (which is broadly 
the same) and ‘of the external aspects of [the EU’s] 
other policies’. This is an ambiguous phrase. On the 
one hand, this could be a reference to any internation-
al action involving policies normally seen as internal. 
More broadly, the term ‘external aspects’ might be read 
as ‘external effects’. This would then require the EU to 
respect extraterritorial human rights in relation the 
effects of its internal policies. The significance of such 
a reading will be addressed below.
The second part of paragraph 3 requires the EU to ‘pur-
sue the objectives’ set out in paragraph 2, though more 
broadly than in that paragraph. Whereas paragraph 2 
refers to conduct ‘in all fields of international rela-
tions’, paragraph 3 refers to ‘the development and 
implementation of the different areas of the Union’s 
external action [and] of the external aspects of [the 
EU’s] other policies’. Otherwise, however, paragraph 2 
is more specific than paragraph 3 on how to pursue 
these objectives.
Taken together, this complex of provisions can only be 
described as confusing. One set of values must be 
‘upheld’ in the EU’s relations with the wider world; 
another set must be both a ‘guide’ for action on the 
international scene, and ‘respected’ in the context of 
external policies and other (ie internal) policies with 
external aspects. The EU must also establish policies 
that ‘promote’ the first set of values as well as act in 
concrete ways ‘in order’ to achieve yet another set of 
values, which it must also ‘pursue’. Nor is this all. In 
the parallel Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) there are further provisions to the same 
effect. Article 205 TFEU on the general provisions on 
the EU’s external action requires the EU’s external 
action to ‘be guided by the principles, pursue the 
objectives and be conducted in accordance with 
[[these] general provisions’ (Article 205 TFEU); and 
similar language is used in Articles 207 TFEU on the 
common commercial policy and Article 208 TFEU on 
development cooperation.15 There are also a number 
of other sources of human rights norms that are bind-
ing on the EU under Article 6 TEU, again overlapping 
both with each other and with those just described.
Application to EU acts with extraterritorial 
effect
The most important question, for present purposes, is 
the extent to which the obligations contained in Arti-
cles 3(5) and 21 TEU apply to EU acts with extraterri-
torial effect, and, if so, to what extent. This question 
is best approached by way of some general remarks 
about the range of extraterritorial situations to which 
human rights obligations can apply and about the 
range of types of obligations which can exist in rela-
tion to any of these given situations. 
Types of extraterritorial situations
There are essentially four types of extraterritorial sit-
uations to which human rights obligations can apply. 
The first involves extraterritorial acts – for example, 
acts of diplomats or military officials. The second con-
15 Article 214(2) TFEU also states that ‘[h]umanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of 
international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination.’ 
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cerns acts relating to territories that are controlled by 
a state – for example, by military occupation. The third 
concerns extraditions and expulsions of persons to a 
country where they might be at risk. The last-men-
tioned cases are not truly extraterritorial because both 
the act and the affected person are within the terri-
tory of the state at the relevant time.16 But there is 
obviously an extraterritorial element (where the risk is 
manifested), and sometimes these situations are con-
fused with extraterritorial situations. The fourth con-
cerns acts that take place domestically but which have 
an effect on persons outside of that territory. These 
situations of extraterritorial effect are of principal rel-
evance to this paper. Because they are potentially the 
broadest in scope, they are also the most controver-
sial.
Types of human rights obligations
In principle, any obligations must be one of two types: 
‘negative’ obligations to refrain from conduct or ‘pos-
itive’ obligations to engage in conduct. In human rights 
law these basic categories have been given further pre-
cision, with a terminology that is by now well under-
stood.
(a) Obligations to ‘respect’ human rights
The minimum type of obligation is for states to refrain 
from themselves committing violations (which includes 
conduct that can be attributed to them under the law 
of state responsibility). In relation to obligations pro-
tecting a person abroad, this would require a state not 
to engage in any conduct that would infringe the rights 
of that person. An example might be a subsidy that so 
depresses world prices that a producer in another 
country is unable to enjoy his/her rights to food or edu-
cation. Of course, it must be established that such an 
obligation exists in the first place.
(b) Obligations to ‘protect’ human rights
The obligation to ‘respect’ human rights only applies 
to state conduct. A different obligation to ‘protect’ 
human rights require states to ensure that other actors 
– usually private parties – do not prevent the enjoy-
ment of rights by other persons. Thus, if there is an 
obligation protecting a person abroad, an obligation 
to ‘protect’ the rights of that person could require a 
state to take positive steps (eg by regulation) directed 
at the acts of private persons. A concrete example 
would be an obligation to regulate the extraterritorial 
activities of EU national corporations.17 The conduct, 
for purposes of the obligation, is still territorial, but it 
is directed at human rights in third countries.
(c) Obligations to ‘fulfil’ rights 
There is also a third category of obligations to ‘fulfil’ 
rights. This latter obligation then breaks down into 
three further sub-obligations (i) to ‘facilitate’ (eg to 
‘provide an enabling environment’); (ii) to ‘promote’ 
(eg raising awareness); and (iii) to ‘provide’ (ie direct 
provision of rights, eg by financial assistance).18 These 
obligations proceed in ascending order of government 
involvement, with those at the final end of the spec-
trum tending to be the most controversial. Finally, 
there are a number of specific obligations to cooper-
ate internationally to promote respect for human 
rights.
Analysis
The extraterritorial scope of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU 
is very broad indeed. These provisions refer, respective-
ly, to ‘relations in the wider world’ and ‘development 
of its external action … and external aspects of its oth-
er policies’. There can be no doubt that these provi-
sions cover not only extraterritorial acts, but also pol-
icies with extraterritorial effects. As to their nature, 
Article 21(3) TEU imposes a clear obligation on the EU 
to ‘respect’ human rights, which means, according to 
the standard usage of this term, that it must not by its 
own conduct violate human rights. Whether there is a 
further obligation to ‘protect’ human rights in relation 
to the acts of third parties is doubtful. It is true that 
the word ‘uphold,’ which is used in Article 3(5) TEU, 
might be read in such a way. However, the word is 
ambiguous. Moreover, the CJEU’s recent decision in 
16 The leading case is Soering (ECtHR, Appl No 14038/88, 7 July 1989). For an explanation of why Soering was not extraterrito-
rial, see Bankovic (ECtHR, Appl No 52207/99, 12 December 2001), para 70.
17 There is no doubt that a home state has the necessary power under international law; the question is whether it has the 
duty to do regulate in this way.
18 UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc E/2007/82 (25 
June 2007), para 12.
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Mugraby indicates that there is no such additional 
duty.19
The background to Mugraby was an allegation that 
Lebanon had violated the applicant’s human rights. 
The applicant argued that the Commission and Coun-
cil were obliged to adopt ‘appropriate measures’ under 
the EU-Lebanon association agreement. The General 
Court and, on appeal, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
disagreed, stating that the ‘non-execution’ clause in 
this agreement established a right to adopt ‘appropri-
ate measures’, not an obligation to do so.20 
As an interpretation of the non-execution clause, this 
ruling is undoubtedly correct. What is relevant for pres-
ent purposes, however, is that neither Court at any 
point considered that there might be an equivalent 
obligation under the EU Treaty requiring the EU to 
adopt appropriate measures. It is true that the precise 
question was not at issue, but this indicates that if the 
EU Treaty does contain an obligation to ‘protect’ human 
rights it is not a particularly obvious obligation.
Even so, the EU does have several obligations to ‘ful-
fil’ human rights. It must ‘promote’ human rights in its 
relations with the wider world (Article 3(5) TEU) by 
establishing common actions to this effect (Article 
21(2) TEU) and also in its designated external policies 
and external aspects of ‘other policies’ (Article 21(3) 
TEU). The EU is also under an obligation to ‘work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of internation-
al relations’ in order to pursue the listed objectives 
(Article 21(2) TEU). This is a concrete obligation to 
cooperate with international actors. What this means 
in the context of free trade agreements is elaborated 
below.
4.2 Other external human rights  
obligations under the EU Treaty
As mentioned, there are a number of other potential-
ly relevant obligations binding on both the EU and its 
Member States. As a matter of EU law, both the EU 
and its Member States (when acting within the scope 
of EU law) must respect fundamental principles of EU 
law derived from the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the constitutional traditions of the Mem-
ber States (Article 6(3) TEU), the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and Freedoms (Article 6(1) TEU) as well 
as customary international law, which includes human 
rights obligations. In addition, the Member States as 
signatories to the ECHR are directly bound by this con-
vention and by other basic international human rights 
treaties to which they are all party, and both the EU 
and its Member States are bound directly by custom-
ary international law. The question to be addressed is 
whether these sources of law impose any obligations 
applicable to legal acts of the EU and its Member 
States with extraterritorial effect.
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 
6(3) TEU)
The extraterritorial situations to which the ECHR 
applies are quite limited. Article 1 of the ECHR impos-
es obligations on states parties only in respect of ‘per-
sons within their jurisdiction’. Quite what ‘jurisdiction’ 
means in this context is a difficult and contested ques-
tion.21 Nonetheless, as far as the present issue is con-
cerned the picture is clear. The European Court of 
Human Rights has applied the ECHR to situations 
involving the first three of the situations mentioned 
above (extraterritorial conduct, territorial control and 
extradition/expulsion). But it has never applied the 
ECHR to situations in which domestic policies have 
had a mere effect on persons abroad.22
It also appears unlikely that it will ever do so. In 
Bankovic, the Court expressly rejected such a propo-
sition. In this case, the applicant argued that the ECHR 
applied to persons affected by the NATO bombings in 
Belgrade. The Court responded as follows:
The Court considers that the applicants’ submission 
is tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely 
affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, 
19 Case T-292/09, Mugraby [2011] ECR II-255 (General Court, Order, 6 September 2011); Case C-581/11 P, Mugraby [2012] 
ECR I-0000 (Grand Chamber, Order, 12 July 2012).
20 General Court, ibid, para 60; Grand Chamber, ibid, para 70.
21 Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on 
Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 857; and cf Marko Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
22 There is an exception in the case of property rights. The Court has considered that a person is within the jurisdiction of a 
state party when property of that person is on the territory of the state party at the time of the violation, even if the person 
is not: Bosphorus (ECtHR, Appl No 45036/98, 30 June 2005), para 137. It is admittedly difficult to reconcile this with the 
general aversion to an effects test, but it is best seen as an anomaly, not an indication that a broader effects test might also 
be legitimate.
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wherever in the world that act may have been com-
mitted or its consequences felt, is thereby brought 
within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose 
of Article 1 of the Convention.23
In short, there is no indication that the Court would 
read the ‘jurisdiction’ requirement so broadly as to 
extend protection to persons affected by an ordinary 
government policy with extraterritorial effects.24 Those 
who have cited the Court’s decisions to this effect take 
them out of context.25
This conclusion is principally relevant to the Member 
States when acting outside of the scope of EU law, 
because in such cases they are bound only by the ECHR 
and international law (discussed below). For the EU, 
and for the Member States when acting within the 
scope of EU law, this conclusion is only a starting point, 
as the modern practice of the CJEU is to adopt the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
on the ECHR as a minimum standard of protection and 
then, in certain cases, to supplement this standard with 
higher levels of protection derived from the EU Char-
ter.26
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 6(1) 
TEU)
Unlike the ECHR, the EU Charter contains no jurisdic-
tional or territorial conditions, so it is an open ques-
tion whether it applies to situations of mere territo-
rial effect.27 There are some indications that it might. 
First, though this is far from determinative, this seems 
to be the view of at least some of the EU institutions. 
In 2011, the European Commission and the CFSP High 
Representative stated jointly that:
EU external action has to comply with the rights 
contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which became binding EU law under the Lisbon 
Treaty, as well as with the rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights.28
 Similarly, the European Parliament has said, in a Res-
olution on the establishment of the European External 
Action Service, that ‘the EEAS must guarantee full 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
all aspects of the Union’s external action in accordance 
with the spirit and purpose of the Lisbon Treaty’.29 
Again, this statement is more of political than legal 
value, but it may indicate a broad approach to the 
issue.
There is also some tentative support in the case law of 
the CJEU to this effect. In Case C-130/10, Parliament 
v Council, the Parliament challenged an EU regulation 
on the basis that it was adopted under an external 
relations power, and was not therefore covered by the 
EU’s human rights guarantees.30 The Court disagreed:
23 Bankovic, above at n 16, para 75. Bankovic was partly overturned in Al Skeini (ECtHR, Appl No 55721/07, 7 July 2011) but 
not on this issue.
24 For recent surveys, see eg Besson and Milanovic, both above at n 21, and Karen Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of 
Selected Human Rights Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), Ch 2.
25 For example, Principle 9(b) of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (‘Maastricht Principles’) states that ‘[a] State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights in any of the following: … situations over which State acts or omissions bring about fore-
seeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory’ and the 
Commentary to this principle cites a number of ECtHR cases in support of this proposition. See Oliver de Schutter et al, 
‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 1084, at 1108; also available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/article-
sAndTranscripts/2012/HRQMaastricht.pdf. However, all of these cases cited concerned extraterritorial acts or an extradition/
expulsion situation and are not relevant to the principle for which they are cited. 
26 In addition, with the exception of the right to property, social and economic rights are not directly covered by the ECHR, so 
in many cases it will offer no guidance. On the indirect protection of social and economic rights under the ECHR see Ellie 
Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart, 2007), Ch 2.
27 See the different views of Valentina Bazzocchi, ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice' in Giacomo di Federico, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument 
(Springer: Vienna: Springer, 2011) at 196 and Valeria Bonavita, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Social 
Dimension of International Trade’, in di Federico, ibid, at 260.
28 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Communica-
tion on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards and More Effective Approach, COM 
(2011) 886 final, 12 December 2011, at 7. See also Tamara Hervey, ‘The “Right to Health” in European Union Law’ in Tamara 
Hervey and Jeff Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Legal Perspective 
(Oxford: Hart, 2003) at 212.
29 European Parliament resolution on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service [2010] OJ 
C/265E, para 5.
30 Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council [2012] ECR I-0000 (19 July 2012). 
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So far as concerns the Parliament’s argument that 
it would be contrary to Union law for it to be pos-
sible for measures to be adopted that impinge 
directly on the fundamental rights of individuals and 
groups by means of a procedure excluding the Par-
liament’s participation, it is to be noted that the 
duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in 
accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, on all the 
institutions and bodies of the Union.
This statement does not necessarily mean that the 
Charter applies to the human rights of persons outside 
the EU. It could simply mean that the Charter would 
cover any incidental effects of the regulation on per-
sons located in the EU. However, it might also have 
that broader meaning, especially in light of Articles 
3(5) and 21 TEU, as discussed above.
There are, however, also countervailing considerations. 
Above a minimum level, human rights protections 
depend very much on the society in which they are 
applied, and it is impossible to equate the levels of pro-
tection that might be appropriate in the EU with those 
that might be appropriate in third countries. If it decid-
ed that general principles of EU law and/or the Char-
ter applied extraterritorially, the CJEU would therefore 
face a choice. Either it would have to apply the same 
levels of protection to third countries, which is unre-
alistic, and possibly even imperialist. One can scarcely 
imagine the EU withdrawing support from a financed 
project in a developing country because not ‘everyone 
[in that country] has the right of access to a free place-
ment service’ (Article 29 EU Charter). Alternatively, the 
CJEU could fragment its jurisprudence according to 
whether the situation is extraterritorial or not. But this 
is an undesirable option.
This choice has not arisen in quite the same way for 
the European Court of Human Rights because of the 
limited situations in which these rights have to be pro-
tected under that Convention,31 and the nature of the 
rights that are likely to be infringed in these situations. 
By contrast, even if the CJEU were to be conservative 
on the extraterritorial situations to which the general 
principles of EU law and/or the Charter applied, it 
would still be faced with a full range of economic, 
social and cultural obligations. It might therefore be 
that the CJEU will reserve Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU 
(which only apply to the EU) for external situations, 
and those in Article 6 TEU (which apply both to the EU 
and the Member States) for domestic situations. But 
only time will tell.
4.3 International human rights  
obligations
As mentioned, the EU Member States are fully bound 
by the standard set of international human rights trea-
ties, to which they are all parties, as well as by cus-
tomary international law. In addition, EU and its Mem-
ber States are bound by customary international law, 
both directly and as a matter of EU law (in the latter 
case the Member States are only so bound when act-
ing within the scope of EU law).32
Treaties
It is clear, first of all, that states have a duty to coop-
erate to promote human rights. Article 56 of the UN 
Charter expressly requires UN members ‘to take joint 
and separate action in co-operation with the [UN] for 
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55 
[which includes the ‘promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all’].33 More concretely, without the reference 
to cooperation with an organization, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has said:
international cooperation for development and thus 
for the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights is an obligation of all States. It is particular-
ly incumbent upon those States which are in a posi-
tion to assist others in this regard.34
This has not been universally accepted, and, in partic-
ular, developed countries have always denied that 
there is an obligation to finance developing countries. 
Thus:
The representatives of the United Kingdom, the 
Czech Republic, Canada, France, and Portugal 
31 See above at n 26.
32 This has been a longstanding rule of EU law. In Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-0000 (21 December 2011), para 101, the 
CJEU stated that, for the EU, this was because of Article 3(5) TEU. However, as Article 3(5) TEU is not addressed to the Mem-
ber States, presumably the Court’s original jurisprudence will continue to explain why, under EU law, they are also bound by 
customary international law when acting within the scope of EU law.
33 See below at n 36.
34 CESCR General Comment No 3 on the Nature of States Parties Obligations (14 December 1990), para 14.
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believed that international co-operation and assis-
tance was an important moral obligation but not a 
legal entitlement, and did not interpret the Cove-
nant to impose a legal obligation to provide devel-
opment assistance or give a legal title to receive 
such aid.35
Such views cannot be discounted, especially given that 
the Committee’s interpretations are non-binding. 
However, in the present case, it is also relevant that 
even EU Member States who have, at times, expressed 
doubts of this kind have by Article 21 TEU now com-
mitted to just such a duty (perhaps even including 
financial undertakings) in respect of the EU.
The question whether international human rights trea-
ties cover measures with extraterritorial effects is also 
difficult. As far as judicial decisions are concerned, the 
situation at the international level parallels that at the 
regional level. In Namibia, the International Court of 
Justice held that the UN Charter imposes human rights 
obligations on its members in situations of effective 
territorial control.36 In Wall, it held that the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
applied to extraterritorial acts carried out ‘in the exer-
cise of [a state’s] jurisdiction’.37 In CERD it gave an 
even broader application to the Convention on Racial 
Discrimination, applying it to extraterritorial acts and 
ordering both parties to the dispute to do ‘all in their 
power to ensure that public authorities and public 
institutions under their control or influence do not 
engage in acts of racial discrimination’.38 The Court 
has never, however, ruled on the application of human 
rights treaties to situations of mere extraterritorial 
effect.
By contrast, there have been relevant statements on 
the point by the UN human rights committees, which 
interpret and apply the UN human rights instruments. 
The majority of these statements are recommenda-
tions, in which the Committees say that state parties 
‘should’ respect human rights in third countries. On 
some occasions, however, the Committee on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights has gone further. In 1997, 
it said, in the context of economic sanctions (and par-
ticularly in light of the sanctions on Iraq), as follows:
Just as the international community insists that any 
targeted State must respect the civil and political 
rights of its citizens, so too must that State and the 
international community itself do everything pos-
sible to protect at least the core content of the eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights of the affected peo-
ples of that State … While this obligation of every 
State is derived from the commitment in the Char-
ter of the United Nations to promote respect for all 
human rights, it should also be recalled that every 
permanent member of the Security Council has 
signed the Covenant, although two (China and the 
United States) have yet to ratify it.39
In 2000, the Committee said, in its General Comment 
on the right to health:
To comply with their international obligations in 
relation to article 12, States parties have to respect 
the enjoyment of the right to health in other coun-
tries, and to prevent third parties from violating the 
right in other countries, if they are able to influence 
these third parties by way of legal or political 
means, in accordance with the Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations and applicable international law.40
35 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Open-ended Working Group established with a view to considering options 
regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2005/52 (10 February 2005), para 76.
36 Namibia, Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 131. Whether Article 56 establishes any obligations and, if so, whether 
these exceed a mere obligation to cooperate with the UN has been debated since the beginnings of the Charter. For a con-
servative point of view see P Gandhi, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years: Its Origins, Significance and 
Impact’ (1998) 41 German Yearbook of International Law 206, 225. Arguably, however, this decision firmly answers the 
question in the affirmative on both points, and additionally contains an extraterritorial dimension: for discussion, see Egon 
Schwelb, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter’ (1972) 66 American Journal of 
International Law 337, 348, and Stephen Schwebel, ‘Human Rights in the World Court’ in Stephen Schwebel (ed), Justice in 
International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) at 163-4.
37 Wall, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 136, paras 111, 112 and 113. The ICJ confirmed the ruling with respect to the ICCPR and 
the CRC in Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 219.
38 CERD (Georgia/Russia), Provisional Measures [2008] ICJ Rep 353, paras 109 and 149.
39 CESCR, General Comment No 8 on the relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultur-
al rights, UN Doc E/1998/22 (1997), paras 7-8 (emphasis added). In later General Comments on the same issue the CESCR 
reverted to using the word ‘should’. See General Comment No 12 on the Right to Adequate Food, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 
(1999), para 37 and General Comment No 14 on the Right to Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 41.
40 CESCR, General Comment 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, (2000), para 39 (emphasis added).
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The Committee used the same terminology in its 2002 
Comment on the right to water, although now the ref-
erence to the ‘protection’ of rights is only a recom-
mendation:
To comply with their international obligations in 
relation to the right to water, States parties have to 
respect the enjoyment of the right in other countries. 
International cooperation requires States parties to 
refrain from actions that interfere, directly or indi-
rectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in 
other countries. Any activities undertaken within 
the State party’s jurisdiction should not deprive 
another country of the ability to realise the right to 
water for persons in its jurisdiction. … Steps should 
be taken by States parties to prevent their own cit-
izens and companies from violating the right to 
water of individuals and communities in other coun-
tries.41
This model was also used in the 2007 Comment on the 
right to social security:
To comply with their international obligations in 
relation to the right to social security, States par-
ties have to respect the enjoyment of the right by 
refraining from actions that interfere, directly or 
indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to social 
security in other countries. … States parties should 
extraterritorially protect the right to social security 
by preventing their own citizens and national enti-
ties from violating this right in other countries.42
In short, the Committee considers there to be an obli-
gation to ‘respect’ human rights in other countries in 
relation to economic sanctions, food, water and social 
security. In relation to the right to health, it has also 
said that there is an obligation to ‘protect’ human 
rights in third countries by regulating private actors 
where this is possible. 
In all other cases, at most it has recommended that 
States respect economic, social and cultural rights in 
other countries. Furthermore, there is some doubt about 
the statement on the obligation to ‘protect’ in relation 
to the right to health, this being taken to mean that 
there is an obligation to regulate the extraterritorial 
acts of nationals (predominantly corporations). In its 
more recent 2011 Statement on the obligations of 
States parties regarding the corporate sector and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, the Committee refers 
to its General Comments on the rights to water, work 
and social security, using the term ‘should’ in connec-
tion with the right to ‘protect’ and ‘shall encourage’ in 
connection with the right to ‘fulfil’.43 Perhaps signifi-
cantly, however, it omits any reference at all to the 
right to health. If this is indeed significant, it indicates 
an alignment with the assessment of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Business and Human Rights, John Rug-
gie in 2007, that ‘[w]hat is difficult to derive from the 
treaties or the treaty bodies is any general obligation 
on States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
violations by business enterprises abroad.’44
The precise wording used by the Committee is fre-
quently treated as insignificant, with ‘should’ being 
read as ‘must’.45 But it is evident from the Committee’s 
practice that when it wants to say ‘must’ it does. Nor 
does the fact that the statements are contained in sec-
tions of the General Comments entitled ‘international 
obligations’ convert a recommendation into a manda-
tory requirement.46 One cannot read more into the 
Committee’s statements than they say.
Of course, the Committee’s interpretations of the Cov-
enant are not binding, and may be both too broad and 
too conservative. In this regard it is relevant that state 
practice is not unambiguously supportive of an obli-
gation to respect economic, social and cultural rights 
in situations of mere economic effect. Indeed, some 
states have expressly rejected such an interpretation.47
In short, while the law may well evolve, at present it 
is at best inconclusive whether the Covenant imposes 
general obligations on states parties to ensure respect 
for economic, social and cultural rights in third coun-
41 CESCR, General Comment 15 on the Right to Water (2002), paras 31-2 (emphasis added).
42 CESCR, General Comment 19 on the Right to Social Security (2007), paras 53-4 (emphasis added).
43 CESCR, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011), paras 5-7.
44 John Ruggie, State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations Core Human 
Rights Treaties: An Overview of Treaty Body Commentaries, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 February 2007), para 84.
45 Eg the Maastricht Principles, above at n 22. An exception is Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘Extraterritoriale menschenrechtliche Sta-
atenpflichten und Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) 49 Archiv des Völkerrechts 34, at 53.
46 For this argument, see John Knox, ‘The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations’ in Radu Mares (ed), The 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 80.
47 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Ninth Session, Summary Record of the 56th Meeting, E/CN.4/2003/SR.56, para 49 (Can-
ada); Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth Session, Summary Record of the 51st Meeting, E/CN.4/2004/SR.51, para 84 
(USA).
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tries in relation to situations of mere extraterritorial 
effect, even if a strong case can be made in relation 
to obligations concerning health, water and social 
security, based on the statements of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Particular 
caution is advisable in relation to the duty to protect, 
for example, requiring states to regulate the extrater-
ritorial activities of their multinational corporations.
Customary international law
This is not quite the end of the analysis. Customary 
international law also contains certain basic obliga-
tions to respect human rights in third countries. 
According to the rule that treaties are to be interpret-
ed by taking into account relevant rules of law appli-
cable between the parties (which includes customary 
international law),48 this means that the international 
human rights treaties impose on their parties at least 
some minimum obligations in this regard. On the oth-
er hand, these rules are in any case directly applicable 
not only to the EU Member States but also to the EU. 
For present purposes it is therefore more important to 
treat the rules as such, rather than as interpretive con-
text for the international human rights treaties.
There are four rules of customary international law 
that are of particularly importance. The first concerns 
the second of the quoted paragraphs in the previous 
section, which dealt with the effect of economic sanc-
tions on populations in third countries. The second 
concerns ancillary responsibility for human rights vio-
lations committed by third states. The third involves 
duties arising from grave breaches of peremptory 
norms by third states (such as genocide, torture, slav-
ery or apartheid). The fourth, much relied upon by the 
Maastricht Principles, is a general norm of due dili-
gence that requires states not to allow their territories 
to be used in a manner that harms human rights in 
third countries.
Effect of sanctions
Article 50(1)(b) of the Articles on State Responsibility 
states that ‘[c]ountermeasures shall not affect … obli-
gations for the protection of fundamental human 
rights’.49 This provision was also expressly approved by 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission.50 It is likely 
that it reflects customary international law. It must be 
noted, that the norm is limited to ‘fundamental’ human 
rights from which no derogation is possible. This 
accords with the reference to ‘the core content of […] 
economic, social and cultural rights’ in the statement, 
quoted above, of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
Ancillary responsibility for involvement in violations 
by third states
The Articles on State Responsibility also contain a 
number of obligations ancillary to the obligations of 
third states. States are prohibited from aiding and 
abetting another state in the commission of a wrong-
ful act (Article 16), directing or controlling the com-
mission of the wrongful act by another state (Article 
17), and coercing another state to commit a wrongful 
act (Article 18). An intention to facilitate the wrong-
ful act is required in all of these cases, expressly in 
relation to Articles 17 and 18, and by implication in 
relation to Article 16. The Commentary to Article 16 
states that a state ‘must know the circumstances in 
which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by 
the other State’, and that the aid ‘must be given with 
a view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful 
act, and must actually do so.’51 In this connection, it 
has been noted that ‘where, using its economic lever-
age or other means of influence at its disposal, one 
State requires that another State accept the inclusion 
in a trade or investment agreement of a provision that 
will prohibit that State from complying with its human 
rights obligations towards its own population or that 
will impede such compliance, the former State may be 
seen as coercing the latter State, which engages its 
international responsibility.’52
Obligations arising from grave breaches of 
peremptory norms
The Articles on State Responsibility also contain pro-
visions on states’ obligations arising from serious 
breaches of peremptory norms of international law 
48 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.
49 The ILC cited in support the CESCR Committee General Comment No 8, above at n 39 and certain obligations in internatio-
nal humanitarian law requiring states to allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores intended 
for civilians: Commentary to Article 50, (2001) II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 132.
50 Prisoners of War – Eritrea’s Claim 17 (Eritrea/Ethiopia), Partial Award (1 July 2003) [2003] 26 Reports of International Arbi-
tral Awards 23, para 160.
51 Commentary, above at n 49, at 65.
52 Guiding Principles, above at n 8, para 2.6.
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(such as apartheid, torture, slavery and genocide) com-
mitted by other states. Article 41 provides that ‘States 
shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful 
means any serious breach [of peremptory norms]’ and 
that ‘[n]o State shall recognise as lawful a situation 
created by a serious breach [of peremptory norms], nor 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.’ 
As opposed to Article 16, this Article imposes upon 
states a positive duty to cooperate to bring such a sit-
uation to an end, and also a duty not to recognise ‘sit-
uations’ created by such breaches.53
It might be commented that, in principle, it could 
appear as though in such situations a human rights 
clause is unnecessary, given the connection with 
peremptory norms. However, this is not the case. Arti-
cle 41 is not itself a jus cogens obligation. A human 
rights clause would therefore enable a party to a trade 
agreement from engaging in conduct required by that 
agreement if this conduct would violate Article 41.
Transboundary harm
Some commentators have in this context referred to 
an additional obligation of possible relevance, con-
cerning a prohibition on causing transboundary harm 
to other states. This obligation has its foundation in 
modern international law in the 1941 Trail Smelter 
arbitration, which was a case about pollution. The tri-
bunal stated that:
Under the principles of international law … no State 
has the right to use or permit the use of its territo-
ry in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in 
or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.54
This statement was reinforced, in a more general con-
text, in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, in which the 
International Court of Justice referred to ‘every State’s 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’. In 
this case, Albania was held responsible for failing to 
warn the UK about the danger of mines laid in its ter-
ritory by a third state (assumed to have been Yugosla-
via). These two cases are generally considered to be 
the foundation of international environmental law, and 
have been reflected in more recent judgments of the 
International Court of Justice on a number of occa-
sions.55
The question, then, is whether these cases require 
states to protect human rights in third countries. The 
argument is that states are under an obligation not to 
allow their territories to be used for acts that harm 
individuals in third states. Certainly, there are some 
cases in which the analogy would seem to hold. For 
example, if Trail Smelter identified an obligation not 
to cause (or allow to be caused) ‘injury by fumes in or 
to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein’ it is but a small step to replace ‘injury by 
fumes’ to injury by harmful products, such as poisoned 
food or, perhaps instruments of repression.56 On the 
other hand, these cases are limited to physical harms 
emanating from a territory (eg pollution or mines), and 
this is quite different from non-physical harms, such 
as the legal or administrative acts of governments or 
private actors.57 The principle is therefore of use in 
some situations, namely those involving exports, but 
not in all.
4.4  Conclusions
The survey above leads to the following conclusions. 
First, the EU and its Member States (when acting with-
in the scope of EU law) are bound by obligations in 
Article 3(5) and 21(3) TEU to refrain from any acts that 
affect the human rights of persons in third countries. 
They are also under obligations under Article 3(5) and 
Article 21(2) and (3) TEU to promote the fulfilment of 
human rights by establishing concrete programmes 
and by cooperating internationally to this end. The sig-
nificance of these obligations cannot be overstated. In 
most respects, they exceed anything on the interna-
tional plane, as has been demonstrated, let alone in 
domestic constitutions.
It is also clear that the ECHR offers nothing in this 
respect. Whether or not general principles of EU law 
or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would apply 
to situations involving extraterritorial effects is unclear 
53 Wall, above at n 37, para 159. Related to this is a customary international obligation not to recognise territorial acquisitions 
resulting from the use of force or other unlawful acts.
54 Trail Smelter (US/Canada) (1941) 3 Reports of International Arbitration Awards 1905, at 1965.
55 Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 29.
56 The argument was first made by Sigrun Skogly and Mark Gibney, ‘Transnational Human Rights Obligations’ (2002) 24 Human 
Rights Quarterly 781; Commentary to Principles 13 and 24 of the Maastricht Principles, above at n 22.
57 This is ignored by the Commentary to Principles 13 and 24 of the Maastricht Principles, ibid.
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(and on balance unlikely), but even if they did they are 
unlikely to exceed the protections in Articles 3(5) and 
Article 21 TEU. As for the international human rights 
treaties, it is still unsettled whether these cover mea-
sures with extraterritorial effects, as is the extent of 
any duty of international cooperation (especially one 
entailing financial assistance). Other rules of custom-
ary international law do, however, have a bearing on 
the situation, and this is of significance, as will be 
mentioned below.
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5 
Gaps and shortcomings in the current 
standard human rights clause
5.1 The necessity of a human rights 
clause
The existence of these obligations is – or at least 
should be – an important constraint on the activities 
of the EU and its Member States, and in particular in 
the context of the negotiation, conclusion and imple-
mentation of their trade and cooperation agreements 
with third countries. However, this does not mean that 
it is necessary for these agreements to contain a 
human rights clause. In many cases, the EU and its 
Member States do not need a human rights clause, or 
even an international agreement, to promote human 
rights in third countries.58 They do not need a human 
rights clause to terminate harmful agricultural subsi-
dies. And they need a human rights clause to regulate 
the extraterritorial activities of EU corporations. A 
human rights clause is only necessary if a norm in the 
international agreement stands in the way of the EU’s 
ability to comply with its human rights obligations. It 
is therefore necessary to consider these obligations, 
and how they might have this effect. 
In this regard, it is relevant that under Article 21(2) 
TEU the EU is obliged not only to respect human rights, 
but to cooperate with the third state in assisting that 
state to comply with its own human rights obligations. 
Furthermore, it is possible, though not clear, that the 
EU Member States are also under an obligation to 
cooperate, based on Article 56 of the UN Charter, and 
the human rights treaties. For these reasons, there is 
no need to draw a distinction between obligations that 
are binding on the EU and its Member States and those 
that are binding on the third state. If an obligation 
binding on the third state is an obstacle to the third 
state’s ability to comply with its own human rights 
obligations, it is incumbent on the EU to cooperate by 
suspending, to the necessary extent, the application 
of that obligation.
5.2 Potential effects on human rights 
of obligations in trade agreements
This section outlines some of the most common obli-
gations found in the EU’s free trade agreements, and 
the ways in which these obligations may be an obsta-
cle to the realization of human rights in third coun-
tries. As stated, it is of secondary importance whether 
the obligation is binding on the EU and its Member 
States or on the other party. Such situations still have 
legal implications for the EU and its Member States 
due to their duty of cooperation.
Financial cooperation
Some (not all) EU agreements contain an obligation to 
provide financial cooperation. An example is the EU-
Egypt association agreement, which states that ‘[i]n 
order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement, a 
financial co-operation package shall be made avail-
able to Egypt in accordance with the appropriate pro-
cedures and the financial resources required.’59 This is 
very similar to the situation which led to the EU’s pol-
icy on human rights clauses. Thus, a human rights 
clause is necessary to terminate the provision of finan-
cial cooperation should such continued cooperation 
be causally connected with human rights violations in 
the third country. 
58 This is not to say that the existing human rights clauses cannot be used as a basis for such activities. It seems like unneces-
sary duplication, just that they are not necessary for this purpose. For the former argument, see Elena Fierro, ‘Legal Basis and 
Scope of the Human Rights Clause in EC Bilateral Agreements’ (2001) 7 European Law Journal 41.
59 Article 72 of the EU-Egypt association agreement.
Gaps and shortcomings in the current standard human rights clause
  
27
Trade obligations
Trade obligations typically restrict the ability of the 
parties to discriminate against products (and some-
times services and service providers) from the other 
party, whether in the form of customs duties, quanti-
tative restrictions or other discriminatory regulations. 
Quantitative export restrictions are also typically pro-
hibited and export duties also prohibited or capped. 
There are many ways in which such obligations can 
have an impact on human rights in third countries. At 
the broadest level, free trade alters the distribution of 
income between social groups, and also between wom-
en and men.60 These effects are complex, but it is con-
ceivable that they include a significant deterioration 
in standards of living, or disproportionate effects on 
women.61 This can be the result of reductions in 
demand for local production, with negative effects on 
local producers. But this can also result from increas-
es in demand for local production, due to new export 
opportunities. Such opportunities could encourage 
unregulated labour, or ‘land grabbing’ to the disadvan-
tage of indigenous peoples.
Trade obligations can also be expensive. One author 
has calculated that the estimated cost of trade facili-
tation for many small developing countries exceeds 
the amount they spend on education.62 Similar issues 
arise in connection with the implementation of intel-
lectual property obligations, which are often included 
in trade agreements. More directly, many developing 
countries derive a large part of their income from tar-
iff revenue, on average about 25 per cent in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, and 15 per cent for developing countries 
worldwide.63 In theory, losses in tariff revenue can be 
recovered via domestic taxation, and where trade has 
positive effects on a country’s economy, overall tax 
revenue will rise. However, a study conducted by the 
IMF found that while high income countries recover 
all of their lost tariff revenue, middle income countries 
recover only 45 to 60 per cent of theirs, and low 
income countries (mainly least developed countries) 
recovered as little as 30 per cent of their lost income.64 
The authors of this study noted specifically that this 
would impact on the ability of these countries to pro-
vide funds for poverty relief and development, with 
‘troubling’ effects on the prospects of future liberal-
ization.65
In addition, some trade obligations can impede gov-
ernment action which require exceptional measures. 
For example, it may be necessary to regulate in a dis-
criminatory manner to support particular disadvan-
taged groups, or to restrict trade in order to ensure 
food security.
Not all of these situations require a human rights 
clause. Some of the negative economic and financial 
effects of these trade liberalization obligations can be 
ameliorated with financial support, and this is typical-
ly provided by the EU.66 As to the inhibitions on third 
country action, all trade agreements already contain 
exceptions for emergency situations, and some of 
these would be relevant in those situations. Trade 
agreements routinely permit the adoption of ‘safe-
guard’ measures and ‘countervailing duties’ when 
unforeseen import surges and subsidised imports cause 
injury to domestic producers. There are typically also 
exceptions to the prohibition on exports when this is 
necessary to protect food security. (And, to reiterate 
the point made above, there are also harms associated 
with trade agreements, such as those flowing from 
subsidised exports, that can be addressed by the EU 
and its Member States without the need for a human 
rights clause).
60 Marzia Fontana, ‘The Gender Effects of Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature’ in Maurizio 
Bussolo and Rafael De Hoyos (eds), Gender Aspects of the Trade and Poverty Nexus: a Macro-Micro Approach (Washington, 
DC: World Bank/Palgrave, 2009), 26. 
61 Human rights law provides limited guarantees against ‘retrogression’. See, for a relevant discussion, Gillian Moon, ‘Fair in 
Form, but Discriminatory in Operation – WTO Law’s Discriminatory Effects on Human Rights in Developing Countries’ (2011) 
14 Journal of International Economic Law 553.
62 Prabhash Ranjan, ‘International Trade and Human Rights’ in Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Bürgi (eds), 
Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 317.
63 Thomas Baunsgaard and Michael Keen, Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization, IMF Working Paper, WT/05/112, June 
2005, 3. See also Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products – Revenue Implications 
of Trade Liberalization – Communication from the United States – Addendum, WTO Doc TN/MA/W/18/Add.2, 11 April 2003. 
Some regional trade agreements provide for compensation: Peter Walkenhorst, ‘Revenue Loss Compensation Mechanisms in 
Regional Trade Agreements’ (2006) 18 Journal of International Development 379.
64 Baunsgaard and Michael Keen, ibid, 22. There were some exceptions, such as Uganda, at 23.
65 Ibid.
66 This does not mean that the negotiations on financial support are straightforward. In the context of the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements, the EU initially argued that specific support for trade liberalization did not need to be provided 
under these agreements because it was already covered by general financial assistance provided under the Cotonou Agree-
ment.
 Gaps and shortcomings in the current standard human rights clause 
28
However, it is possible that the strict conditions for 
the application of these exceptions are not met. Also, 
while these exceptions take into account certain det-
rimental economic effects, they do not look at impacts 
on all social and economic rights.67 Finally, there are 
also obligations that have no viable exceptions. For 
example, it is not always clear that the general excep-
tion permit a party to impose trade restrictions in order 
to safeguard human rights in the other country: 
indeed, a specific exception to this effect in the EU-
Cariforum agreement proves the rule.68 This can com-
plicate restrictions on imports of products produced in 
violation of core labour standards, or restrictions on 
exports of weapons used for repressive purposes. Nor 
are there usually any exceptions that would allow a 
party to an agreement to discriminate in favour of 
minority groups. For such cases, it could be useful to 
include a human rights clause that specifically autho-
rises a party to comply with – or facilitate compliance 
with – human rights obligations.
Other economic obligations
Some agreements contain provisions on services, gov-
ernment procurement, intellectual property and invest-
ment. In each of these cases, it is possible that these 
provisions can inhibit the third state’s ability to com-
ply with its human rights obligations. In all of these 
cases, a human rights clause can be necessary to 
ensure that the obligations in these agreements do not 
inhibit the third country’s ability to comply with its 
human rights obligations or implicate the EU in human 
rights violations occurring in that third country. Obli-
gations on services and government procurement are 
particularly problematic in relation to discrimination, 
while obligations on intellectual property can interfere 
with the right to food (for example, in relation to the 
creation of rights over plant varieties under UPOV 91) 
or the right to health (for example, in relation to the 
patenting of essential medicines). Another issue con-
cerns the large compensation sums payable by devel-
oping countries as a result of losing investment cases.
5.3 Deficiencies of the standard human 
rights clause
The analysis in section 4 of this paper showed that the 
EU and (in part) its Member States have independent 
human rights obligations in relation to the extraterri-
torial effects of their internal and external policies. The 
discussion in sections 5.1 and 5.2 has shown that there 
are occasions when these obligations require the EU 
and (in part) its Member States to act in a manner that 
would be prohibited by obligations commonly found 
in trade agreements, and for which there are no stan-
dard exceptions. The conclusion is that there is, there-
fore, a need for a specific human rights clause that 
enables the parties to such agreement to adopt appro-
priate measures when necessary. This raises the ques-
tion whether the standard human rights clause is ade-
quate to this task. For two main reasons, it is not.
First, the standard human rights clause does not allow 
a party to protect human rights in its own territory. 
The general exceptions that are found in trade agree-
ments permit measures to protect human health and 
life, but, as noted above, this is barely sufficient. For 
this reason, all trade agreements should contain claus-
es permitting exceptional measures to be adopted to 
protect human rights domestically. For both the EU 
and the third country, this is necessary in order for 
them to be able to comply with their own obligations 
to ensure the protection of human rights in areas for 
which they are primarily responsible. In addition, as 
has been shown, under EU law the EU is also subject 
to an additional obligation to cooperate with third 
countries in this respect. This obligation can justifiably 
be read as requiring the EU to include such a clause 
for the benefit of the third party as well.
The second problem is that the standard human rights 
clause is triggered by a violation by the other party. 
This is too limited. As has been shown, the EU has an 
independent obligation to ensure that it respects 
human rights in a third country, regardless of the obli-
gations of the third country. Indeed, this obligation 
may require the EU to act even when the third coun-
try is itself not responsible, due to a lack of capacity. 
It is therefore legally necessary, under EU law, for the 
EU to be able to adopt measures under a human rights 
clause without having to demonstrate that a third 
state is responsible for human rights violations.
The following section discusses two potential solutions 
to these problem. It also proposes reforms to the exist-
ing human rights clause which might not be strictly 
necessary, on the present state of the law, for the EU 
67 There is, exceptionally, a broader than usual ‘safeguards’ clause in Article 25(2)(b) of the EU-Cariforum Agreement. This 
clause permits safeguard measures to be adopted in cases of ‘disturbances in a sector of the economy, particularly where 
these disturbances produce major social problems, or difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in the eco-
nomic situation of the importing Party’.
68 See below at n 69.
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to be able to comply with its extraterritorial human 
rights obligations, but which will make this easier to 
do. These include the introduction of a mandatory peri-
odic human rights impact assessment, together with 
enhanced powers (and duties) of the joint council 
established under the agreement to take action to 
implement the results of any such assessment, and an 
enhanced role for civil society, the EU Member States 
and the European Parliament in the monitoring and 
enforcement of the human rights obligations in the 
agreement. 
Before turning to these issues, however, a caveat is 
necessary. Regardless of the deficiencies of the stan-
dard human rights clause in terms of the EU’s legal 
obligations, it should not be forgotten that the human 
rights clause is also a key instrument in the EU’s pro-
jection of its ethical foreign policy. In its existing form, 
the clause allows the EU to impose sanctions on third 
countries that violate human rights. Whether or not it 
is a legal requirement that the EU act in this way may 
be doubted: in Mugraby the CJEU held that it was not. 
For this reason, there has been little emphasis on this 
aspect of the clause in this paper, which is focused on 
necessary changes to the human rights clause. None-
theless, it is worth noting that this is not its only func-
tion.
A new human rights clause: necessary and optional reforms
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6 
A new human rights clause: necessary 
and optional reforms
6.1 Necessary reforms: unilateral action
As mentioned, the key legal difficulty with the exist-
ing human rights clause is that it does not permit a 
party to take unilateral action to protect human rights 
domestically or extraterritorially independent of a 
human rights violation committed by the other party. 
There are two ways to address this problem. One is to 
rewrite the existing non-execution clause to provide 
for such a right. An example would be as follows (in 
bold):
P1. If one of the Parties considers that the other Par-
ty has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Agree-
ment or that a provision of the Agreement restricts 
its own ability to meet its human rights obliga-
tions it may take appropriate measures. Before doing 
so, it must supply the [Joint Council] within 30 days 
with all the relevant information required for a thor-
ough examination of the situation with a view to 
seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.
It must be observed that many non-execution clauses 
are not subject to dispute settlement. This, of course, 
would put the party adopting the measure in a rela-
tively strong position. Whether this is politically pal-
atable is of course an open question. 
A second option is to add a clause to the general 
exceptions that are included in every trade agreement, 
permitting a party to adopt measures taken to respect, 
promote or fulfil human rights as defined in the essen-
tial elements clause. Importantly, it would need to be 
clear that measures may be adopted with respect to 
human rights domestically as well as extraterritorially. 
This is because it is normally contested whether there 
is a right to take measures to protect interests in oth-
er countries (other than under the public morals excep-
tion, where technically the interest is that of the reg-
ulating state anyway). 
In some cases the EU has begun to do this. An exam-
ple has been cited: the EU-Cariforum agreement con-
tains a footnote stating that ‘[t]he Parties agree that 
… measures necessary to combat child labour shall be 
deemed to be included within the meaning of mea-
sures necessary to protect public morals or measures 
necessary for the protection of health.’69 Other coun-
tries have similarly broadened the scope of these pro-
visions. For example, New Zealand has included a 
clause in its free trade agreements permitting it to 
adopt ‘measures it deems necessary to accord more 
favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters 
covered by this Agreement including in fulfilment of 
its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.’ Other 
regional trade agreements also make allowance for 
positive discrimination, but in the more limited con-
texts of cross-border services, investment and govern-
ment procurement.70 These clauses are all steps along 
the way. But for the EU to comply with its obligations, 
a more robust clause is needed. 
Both options – for an amendment to the existing non-
execution clause, and for an expanded general excep-
tions clause – are presented below as Draft Clauses X2 
and X4 respectively. It should be pointed out that it 
would be preferable to decide on one of these options, 
at least for measures that are necessary for the par-
ties to respect human rights (which is also what is nec-
essary for the EU, according to its obligations). The 
reason is that otherwise there is a risk of opening two 
procedural routes for the same type of measure, with 
different procedures and slightly different conditions.
69 Article 224(1) footnote 1, Cariforum-EU Economic Partnership Agreement.
70 Lorand Bartels, ‘Social Issues: Labour, Environment and Human Rights' in Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio (eds), Bilateral 
and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis, Vol 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) at 351.
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6.2 Potentially necessary changes: 
human rights impact assessments  
and review of the operation of the 
agreement
In the long term, it would also be desirable – and pos-
sibly necessary – for the EU’s agreements to provide 
for a mechanism for reviewing the implementation of 
the agreement in accordance with human rights 
norms, on the basis of a human rights impact assess-
ment, and for making amendments to the agreement 
where possible. 
This would be in accordance with the Guiding Princi-
ples on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade 
and Investment Agreements drafted by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, which recommend 
that ‘[a] human rights impact assessment should be 
conceived of as an iterative process, taking place on a 
regular basis, for instance, every three or five years.’71 
Importantly, however, this may also be an important 
means of remaining in compliance with EU law, which 
is beginning to emphasise the importance of conduct-
ing impact assessments.
The law on this issue is still developing, but in Spain v 
Council, the European Court of Justice annulled an EU 
Council Regulation on the grounds that it was dispro-
portionate, this being because the EU Council, not hav-
ing conducted an impact assessment, was not able to 
show that it had taken into account all necessary fac-
tors and circumstances in its decision to adopt the 
measure.72 In this case, the necessity of these factors 
was established in the measure itself. But it would be 
logical that the necessity of relevant factors can be 
established by other EU norms, and in particular pri-
mary EU law. One could therefore argue that, follow-
ing Spain v Council, an EU institution adopting a mea-
sure must be able to demonstrate that it has taken into 
account the impact of that measure on human rights, 
which is a relevant factor under EU law. Of course, this 
remedy is only available for EU measures: it has no 
application in the context of omissions to adopt mea-
sures, which are equally important in the present con-
text.
The EU-Cariforum agreement presents a framework for 
a procedure based on human rights impact assess-
ments and review of the agreement. Article 5 states 
that:
The Parties undertake to monitor continuously the 
operation of the Agreement through their respec-
tive participative processes and institutions, as well 
as those set up under this Agreement, in order to 
ensure that the objectives of the Agreement are 
realised, the Agreement is properly implemented 
and the benefits men, women, young people and 
children deriving from their Partnership are maxi-
mised. The Parties also undertake to consult each 
other promptly over any problem that may arise.
A provision to this effect should be included in all 
future EU trade agreements, ideally with greater spec-
ificity as to the human rights aspects of the monitor-
ing process. An effective means of doing this would be 
to make specific reference to the carrying out of a 
human rights impact assessment.73 The Guiding Prin-
ciples on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade 
and Investment Agreements also list certain minimum 
principles that should be followed. These are: the inde-
pendence of the body carrying out the review, trans-
parency in the review process, inclusive participation 
of all persons affected, sufficient expertise and fund-
ing.74 A model clause is set out below that takes these 
principles into account.
Another principle made by the Guiding Principles con-
cerns the ‘status’ of recommendations. The Principles 
give the example of the public presentation of the 
results of a review, for example before parliament. In 
the context of a trade agreement, it is essential that 
the results of a human rights impact assessment lead 
to concrete action, if necessary by an amendment of 
the agreement, or a suspension of its provisions. From 
a legal and political perspective, this is most easily 
done by the organs of the agreement, and in particu-
71 Guiding Principles, above at n 8, para 3.3. The report was well received: see FES Geneva Reports, Report on the 19th Regular 
Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 23 March 2012, http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/2012_03_
Report_HRC19_TR.pdf, at 7 (retrieved on 5 February 2013).
72 C-310/04, Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7318, paras 133-5. It is important to note that the Court did not find that there was 
an obligation to conduct an impact assessment. The problem concerned the consequences of not conducting an impact 
assessment, namely that there was no evidence that relevant factors had been taken into account. Conceivably, there are 
other ways of showing that relevant factors have been taken into account, but an impact assessment is the most common 
means of doing this, and consistent with the EU’s practice in many other areas.
73 See James Harrison and Alessa Goller, ‘Trade and Human Rights: What Does “Impact Assessment” Have to Offer?’ (2008) 8 
Human Rights Law Review 587 and the information at http://www.humanrightsimpact.org/.
74 Guiding Principles, above at n 8, paras 4.1-4.7. 
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lar the joint council established under each of the EU 
trade agreements. Again, the EU-Cariforum agreement 
affords an example. Article 5, just quoted, is accom-
panied by a Joint Declaration on the Signing of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement, which states (with 
emphasis) as follows:
We understand that, in the context of our contin-
ued monitoring of the Agreement within its insti-
tutions, as provided for under article 5 of the Agree-
ment, a comprehensive review of the Agreement 
shall be undertaken not later than five (5) years after 
the date of signature and at subsequent five-year-
ly intervals, in order to determine the impact of the 
Agreement, including the costs and consequences 
of implementation and we undertake to amend its 
provisions and adjust their application as necessary.
A provision to similar effect could also be included in 
all future EU trade agreements. However, a caveat 
must be noted, which is that the EU-Cariforum joint 
council has, unusually, a general power ‘to take deci-
sions in respect of all matters covered by the Agree-
ment’ (Article 229). This includes the power to suspend 
the application of provisions of the agreement in 
appropriate cases, including those cases mentioned 
here. By contrast, most of the equivalent bodies estab-
lished under other agreements have more limited pow-
ers. For these bodies to be able to amend or suspend 
the operation of their respective agreements for 
human rights reasons, it may be necessary to give them 
an express power to do so. The precise powers of these 
organs differ from agreement to agreement, and 
accordingly so will such a power.
It might also be noted that, from an accountability 
perspective, there are certain difficulties with the 
broad powers of the Joint Council under the EU-Cari-
forum agreement. In particular, this organ has the 
power to add to obligations in the agreement, as well 
as to suspend them. It is not therefore suggested that 
all these powers should be replicated in other agree-
ments. What is suggested, however, is that such organs 
have a specific power – and even a mandate – to sus-
pend or amend provisions of the agreement where this 
is necessary for human rights reasons.
6.3 Optional reforms to improve the 
functioning of the human rights clause
The foregoing has focused on the type of human rights 
clause that is necessary for the EU and its Member 
States to be able to comply with their human rights 
obligations. There are, however, are a number of 
reforms which are not necessary for the EU to comply 
with its human rights obligations, but which would 
improve the functioning of the human rights clause.
Relationship between the human rights clause 
and the labour provisions in recent EU trade 
agreements
Since the 2008 EU-Cariforum agreement, the EU’s 
trade agreements have all contained ‘sustainable 
development’ chapters, focusing on labour and envi-
ronmental standards, and setting out specific mecha-
nisms for the implementation, monitoring and enforce-
ment of these obligations. There is an undeniable 
overlap between the coverage of the human rights 
clause and these provisions, and in particular those on 
labour standards.75 It is beyond question that Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) core labour standards 
are also human rights;76 and indeed the European 
Commission has acknowledged that core labour stan-
dards are covered by the standard human rights claus-
es.77 Likewise, there is an increasing overlap between 
human rights and environmental protection, particu-
larly in the context of indigenous rights and trans-
boundary pollution.78 
Ideally, of course, one would wish for consistency in 
these provisions. It is indeed regrettable that, after a 
decade of experience with human rights clauses, the 
EU should have drafted what are in some respect dupli-
cate provisions. The reason lies in the EU’s commit-
ment to an overall policy of sustainable development, 
75 Lorand Bartels, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in the EU’s Free Trade Agreements’, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 24/2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140033. The overlap is not 
perfect. There is no equivalent for ‘democratic principles’ in the sustainability chapter; nor does the human rights clause 
necessarily prevent a treaty party from reducing the level of protection offered by domestic labour and environment legisla-
tion.
76 Philip Alston, ‘“Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime' (2004) 14 Europe-
an Journal of International Law 457, at 476 and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ (2012) 3 Europe-
an Labour Law Journal 151.
77 European Commission Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context 
of Globalisation, COM (2001) 416, at 12.
78 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 613.
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but that does not quite explain the adoption of these 
‘sustainable development’ chapters. These chapters are 
based completely on a model dating back to NAFTA, 
and found in all US and Canadian trade agreements 
since then, without a significant link being made to 
the concept of sustainable development, and certain-
ly not in relation to the labour chapter. One suspects 
that this duplication of effort was based on a narrow 
view of the human rights clause as, expressis verbis, 
limited to the political situations in which it has so far 
been applied. The question, however, is whether it 
causes any harm.
The question, then, is whether in such cases it makes 
sense for such different provisions on implementation 
and remedies to apply to the same state conduct, and, 
if not, what should be done about it. In fact, having 
two different mechanisms for the same violation is not 
necessarily problematic. This simply gives the injured 
party a choice of options. There are, admittedly, situ-
ations in which the question of how to frame a viola-
tion has turned out to be important. US administrators 
once rejected a petition under the US GSP system in 
relation to the murder of a trade union leader on the 
basis that this constituted a violation of ‘human rights’ 
rather than of ‘worker rights’ (under which this could 
have been relevant).79 But this is a peculiar case, and 
it is more likely that such a violation would be seen as 
both a human rights violation and a worker rights vio-
lation, depending on where it is presented.
What this means is that the real difficulties with these 
duplicate clauses is not substantive but institutional. 
In some respects, the human rights clauses are stron-
ger. They cover additional norms (compared to the 
labour obligations), and they are enforceable by way 
of sanctions. On the other hand, what the labour obli-
gations lack in terms of raw enforceability, they gain 
in administrative sophistication. The provisions on civ-
il society discussed above are located in the sustain-
able development chapters of the respective trade 
agreements. One solution, then, would be to increase 
the mandate of these groups to cover human rights as 
well. But too much emphasis on this track might weak-
en the possibility of gaining greater access to the more 
wide-ranging norms available under the human rights 
clause.
In short, the best solution is probably to seek to 
improve both sets of provisions: the human rights 
clause by making it more transparent and viable, and 
the labour standards provisions by increasing their 
enforceability. And in the process, there is little to be 
lost by cross-fertilizing the best aspects of each set of 
provisions with those of the other. 
A role for the European Parliament
While the European Parliament’s consent is required 
for new trade agreements,80 it has only a limited role 
in relation to the suspension of these agreements. Arti-
cle 218(9) TFEU authorises the Council to suspend 
agreements. The European Parliament is at most enti-
tled to be informed. This right derives from Article 
218(10) TFEU, supplemented by the Framework Agree-
ment on relations between the European Parliament 
and the European Commission, which adds that ‘[t]he 
Commission shall inform the Council and Parliament 
simultaneously and in due time of its intention to pro-
pose to the Council the suspension of an internation-
al agreement and of the reasons therefor.’81
One might question whether this is an ideal situation. 
The European Parliament plays a key role in relation to 
the EU’s human rights policy, and an argument could 
be made that it should be involved in any decisions to 
suspend the application of an agreement if this is nec-
essary for human rights reasons. This is particularly the 
case in relation to human rights issues that go beyond 
the ‘political’ issues in relation to which the EU’s 
human rights clause has traditionally been invoked, 
but stem from the effects, short and long term, of the 
trade agreement itself. How such involvement might 
be operationalised depends on the powers that are 
granted under the agreement itself. If the agreement 
endows a Joint Council with wide-ranging powers to 
amend the agreement (as in the EU-Cariforum agree-
ment), then arguably the Parliament should have a role 
at that stage. An alternative would be for the Parlia-
ment to have a role in the formation of common posi-
tions by the Council. The details obviously require fur-
ther thought, and it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to make suggestions in this regard.
79 US General Accounting Office, International Trade: Assessment of the Generalized System of Preferences, GAO/GGD-95–9, 
November 1994, 109, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154744.pdf, cited in Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade 
(Oxford: Hart, 2005), 96. 
80 Article 218(6)(a)(v) and Article 207(2) TFEU. See Markus Krajewski, ‘The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy’ in Andrea 
Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stephanie Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 309.
81 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission [2010] L304/47, Annex 
III, point 8.
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A role for the Member States
It is now routine for trade agreements to be conclud-
ed by the EU and the Member States jointly, making 
these what is known as ‘mixed agreements’.82 In prin-
ciple, this means that the EU should act in matters for 
which it is competent and the Member States in mat-
ters for which they are competent. This can complicate 
the taking of ‘appropriate measures’ falling within the 
competences of both the EU and the Member States. 
To account for this, in relation to the human rights 
clause in the Cotonou Agreement the EU and the Mem-
ber States have concluded an Internal Agreement in 
which the Member States authorise the EU Council to 
take decisions concerning ‘appropriate measures’, and 
which further specifies that such decisions are taken 
by qualified majority voting (which the Member States 
undertake to implement).83 The Internal Agreement 
also deals with certain other procedural issues. 
To date, all of the cases in which appropriate measures 
have been adopted under a human rights clause have 
involved the Cotonou Agreement. It is not certain that 
the absence of an equivalent internal agreement in the 
other agreements has had the effect of inhibiting the 
use of the human rights clauses in those agreements. 
However, it seems likely that a detailed procedure set-
ting out the way that the mechanism can work in prac-
tice could only facilitate their use, should the possibil-
ity of such use arise. 
A role for civil society
Existing role for civil society
It is also appropriate to consider the role of civil soci-
ety in relation to the human rights impact of trade 
agreements. The most recent EU free trade agreements 
do foresee a role for civil society, either via a agree-
ment-specific consultative committee (EU-Cariforum 
agreement), joint and separate meetings of agree-
ment-specific ‘Domestic Action Groups’ (EU-Korea 
agreement) or individual meetings of agreement-spe-
cific civil society groups administered by a joint con-
sultative committee composed of organised civil soci-
ety in the EU and the other party (EU-Central America 
agreement). Others only foresee a very weak role for 
civil society (EU-Colombia/Peru) or none at all (eg EU-
Iraq, which provides not for full free trade but for trade 
on a most favoured nation basis).
The most advanced of these agreements is the EU-
Cariforum agreement, and it is suggested that in rela-
tion to civil society it should be taken as a model. The 
EU-Cariforum Consultative Committee has the status 
of an organ of the agreement, has direct access to the 
principal Joint Council, providing it with recommen-
dations after consultation or on its own initiative. In 
addition, the Consultative Committee receives the 
reports of the Committees of Experts tasked with 
resolving disputes on the implementation of the labour 
and environment obligations.84 The mandate of the 
Consultative Committee is to promote dialogue and 
cooperation ‘encompass[ing] all economic, social and 
environmental aspects of the relations between the 
[parties], as they arise in the context of the implemen-
tation of this Agreement.’85 This broad mandate is to 
be welcomed, although it should be enhanced by spe-
cific reference to human rights.
A complaint mechanism
It remains to be considered whether a mechanism 
should be envisaged for civil society to enforce human 
rights obligations. Various models might be envisaged, 
depending on the issues arising. However, it is diffi-
cult, without adding significantly to the institutional 
structure of the agreements, to provide for a direct 
action brought by a private party in relation to viola-
tions of obligations by the parties. The difficulty is that 
there is no standing independent institution to receive 
such a complaint, either in the form of a standing judi-
cial organ or even in the form of a permanent secre-
tariat. 
There is one precedent for such a mechanism, which 
is for environmental (but not labour) complaints under 
the environmental side agreement to NAFTA, and sub-
sequently in CAFTA. These agreements provide for 
complaints to a designated secretariat. In the case of 
NAFTA, the secretariat was established under that 
agreement, while in the case of CAFTA the parties sub-
sequently requested the Secretariat for Central Amer-
82 An unusual exception is the EU-Pacific Interim Partnership Agreement concluded with Fiji and Papua New Guinea.
83 Internal agreement between the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on 
measures to be taken and procedures to be followed for the implementation of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement [2000] OJ 
L317/376, amended by another Internal Agreement [2006] OJ L247/48.
84 Article 189(6) and Article 195(6) of the EU-Cariforum agreement.
85 Article 232(1) of the EU-Cariforum agreement.
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ican Economic Integration to establish a new unit to 
act as a secretariat for these purposes.86 It is unlikely 
that this approach would be adopted for the EU trade 
agreements. Indeed, it has not even been adopted by 
the US for labour matters.
A more realistic alternative is to opt for a domestic 
mechanism providing for complaints to be made to the 
EU, with a mandatory requirement that the EU take 
appropriate measures, either with or without the coop-
eration of the other party, depending on the nature of 
the violation. There are precedents for such models. In 
relation to the labour standards provisions contained 
in the US free trade agreements, the US, by domestic 
legislation, gives any person (including natural persons 
and other organizations) the right to file a submission 
with the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs requesting 
that the government instigate consultations with the 
other party for alleged violations.87 A detailed proce-
dure exists, including public hearings, prior to the insti-
gation of consultations. There have been many com-
plaints since NAFTA came into force, and recently there 
has also been a request for a panel by the US against 
Guatemala under CAFTA.
There is nothing directly equivalent in the EU in rela-
tion to such matters, although there are related pro-
cedures in slightly different contexts. The new GSP 
Regulation, due to come into effect in 2014, gives the 
European Commission the power to withdraw GSP+ 
preferences from beneficiaries that have failed to 
implement certain human rights conventions. It states 
that:
In drawing its conclusions concerning effective 
implementation of the relevant conventions, the 
Commission shall assess the conclusions and rec-
ommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, 
as well as, without prejudice to other sources, infor-
mation submitted by third parties, including civil 
society, social partners, the European Parliament or 
the Council.88 
In relation to economic matters, the procedures for 
individual complaints are far better developed. Thus, 
under the Trade Barriers Regulation companies and 
industry associations are able to bring a complaint to 
the European Commission alleging violations of trade 
obligations (under both WTO law and free trade agree-
ments), which, following an investigation and report, 
can lead to the bringing of legal action by the EU.89 
There are similar mechanisms for antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases.
The absence of any possibility for EU civil society to 
bring a complaint about human rights violations asso-
ciated with a trade agreement stands in stark contrast 
to these examples. This also stands in stark contrast to 
the EU’s values, which prize human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. It is entirely consistent with these 
values to expect that a mechanism similar to the Trade 
Barriers Regulation be established, accessible to indi-
viduals and civil society, with a mandate to investigate 
and report on issues arising under the human rights 
obligations set out in the EU’s free trade agreements, 
with the possibility of dispute settlement or other 
appropriate measures should the matter not be 
resolved satisfactorily.
86 See Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters Under the Dominican Republic- Central America- Unit-
ed States Free Trade Agreement, 27 July 2006, available at: http://www.oas.org/dsd/Tool-kit/Documentos/MOduleII/
CAFTA%20-%20Agreement%20to%20Establish%20Secretariat.pdf (retrieved on 5 February 2013). 
87 Bureau of International Labor Affairs; Notice of Reassignment of Functions of Office of Trade Agreement Implementation to 
Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; Notice of Procedural Guidelines (2006) 71 (245) Federal Register 76691, available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2006-12-21/pdf/E6-21837.pdf#page=1. For an example of a complaint under this provision, see 
http://www.usleap.org/files/Guatemala%20CAFTA%20Complaint%202008.PDF (retrieved on 5 February 2014). For an expla-
nation, see http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/freetradeagreement.htm#.UPGbABlrTfg (retrieved on 5 February 2014). 
88 Article 14(3) of EU Regulation 978/2012 [2012] OJ L303/1, concerning the withdrawal of GSP+ preferences. No reference is 
made to civil society in relation to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of other GSP preferences, inter alia, for serious 
and systematic violations of these conventions: Article 19(6). However, Recital 15, which is in similar terms of Article 14(3), 
indicates that Article 19(6) should be read in this way as well. 
89 Regulation No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure 
the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of 
the World Trade Organization [1994] OJ L349/71, as amended. See consolidated version at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1994R3286:20080305:EN:PDF. For an outline, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-
unfair-trade/trade-barriers/ (retrieved on 5 February 2014).
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7 
A model human rights clause with  
commentary
This section outlines a set of draft provisions for a new 
model human rights clause. It is based on clauses 
found in EU agreements, with additional revisions in 
marked up text.
X1. Human rights obligations
The parties reaffirm their obligations concerning 
democratic principles and human rights, as laid down 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and oth-
er relevant international human rights instruments, and 
the rule of law, and undertake to comply with these 
obligations in their internal and international policies. 
Comment
This clause clearly establishes an obligation to respect 
democratic principles and human rights. There is no 
need to refer to ‘essential elements’, as a breach of this 
obligation is regulated in the agreement in any case 
by the non-execution clause (this does not represent 
a change).
The reference for the relevant principles is ‘the Univer-
sal Declaration on Human Rights and other relevant 
international human rights instruments’. This phrase 
is sufficiently broad to cover all situations. By impli-
cation, all treaties binding on the parties are ‘relevant’, 
and others not binding on the parties might also be 
‘relevant’. There is nothing to be gained by further 
specificity, and indeed the present wording also allows 
for future agreements to become ‘relevant’.
X2. Non-execution clause
P1. If one of the Parties considers that the other Party 
has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Agreement 
or that a provision of the Agreement restricts its own 
ability to meet its human rights obligations it may 
take appropriate measures. Before doing so, it must 
supply the [Joint Council] within 30 days with all the 
relevant information required for a thorough examina-
tion of the situation with a view to seeking a solution 
acceptable to the Parties.
In this selection of measures, priority must be given to 
those which least disturb the functioning of this Agree-
ment. These measures shall be notified immediately to 
the Cooperation Council and shall be the subject of 
consultations in the Cooperation Council if the other 
Party so requests.
P2. By way of derogation from paragraph [P1], any Par-
ty may immediately take appropriate measures in 
accordance with international law in case of:
(a) denunciation of this Agreement not sanctioned 
by the general rules of international law;
(b) violation by the other Party of Article [X1]
In such cases, ‘appropriate measures’ must be taken in 
accordance with international law, and must be pro-
portional to the violation. In the selection and imple-
mentation of these measures, the Parties will pay par-
ticular attention to the circumstances of the most 
vulnerable groups of the population and will ensure 
that they are not unduly penalised.
The other Party may ask that an urgent meeting be 
called to bring the Parties together within 15 days for 
a thorough examination of the situation with a view to 
seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.
Comment
This clause is an amalgam of various existing human 
rights clauses, with the exception of the underlined 
words, which now refer clearly to a violation of the 
clause on human rights obligations (formerly the 
‘essential elements’ clause), as opposed to a violation 
of (hitherto undefined) ‘essential elements’. 
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The clause also contains an option (underlined) for per-
mitting a party to adopt appropriate measures unilat-
erally in the event that this is necessary for the party 
to comply with its human rights obligations, both 
internal and extraterritorial. This responds to the main 
deficiency of the existing human rights clause, as dis-
cussed above. As mentioned, this clause should be 
treated as one option to solve this problem; the other 
being contained in draft clause X4.
X3. Human Rights Committee
A Human Rights Committee is hereby established com-
posed of representatives of the Parties and with a view 
to assist the [Joint Council] in its duties. The Commit-
tee shall discuss any matters arising in connection with 
the obligations of the parties concerning human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law.
Comment
Human rights subcommittees have been established 
under some of the EU’s agreements. It is however 
appropriate that human rights committees be estab-
lished as permanent features of all agreements. The 
mandate of such a committee, as described here, is 
broad, covering all matters arising under the essential 
elements clause.
X4. General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the 
Parties where like conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on trade in goods [, services or establish-
ment], nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by the parties of 
measures:
P1. undertaken for the purpose of respecting, pro-
tecting or fulfilling human rights and respecting 
democratic principles and the rule of law in their 
internal and international policies
Comment
The first paragraph is standard in general exceptions 
clauses in trade agreements (which are originally based 
on Article XX GATT). The novelty is the new paragraph 
P1, which permits a party to adopt measures in rela-
tion to their internal and international policies. This is 
one of the two options necessary to insert in trade 
agreements in order to ensure that the EU and its 
Member States are always able to comply with their 
human rights obligations. The other is above in draft 
clause X2.
It should also be noted that this clause goes further, 
and permits measures to ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ human 
rights. This can be justified on the grounds that, unlike 
draft clause X2, such measures are subject to the con-
dition that the measures may not be unjustifiably or 
arbitrarily discriminatory.
It is important to note that paragraph P1 does not have 
an express territorial limitation. The phrasing that is 
used is ‘in their internal and international policies’, 
which is taken from Article X1. It allows the parties to 
take measures sufficient to ensure that each party is 
able to take action with respect to human rights in the 
territory of the other party as well; and indeed, in oth-
er territories as well, if the need ever arises.
X5. Human rights impact assessment and 
review clause
The Parties undertake to monitor continuously the 
operation of the Agreement through their respective 
participative processes and institutions, as well as those 
set up under this Agreement, in order to ensure that the 
implementation of the agreement does not affect 
the obligations of the Parties in [Article X1].
A comprehensive review of the Agreement shall be 
undertaken by the parties not later than five (5) years 
after the date of signature and at subsequent five-year-
ly intervals, in order to determine the impact of the 
Agreement on human rights, including the costs and 
consequences of implementation.
The review will be undertaken on the basis of a human 
rights impact assessment conducted by an independent 
body with appropriate expertise in the subject of human 
rights impact assessments, on the basis of transparent 
information and procedures, taking into account all 
available and relevant evidence from all sources, espe-
cially civil society, and will be appropriately resourced.
The human rights impact assessment and a report of 
the review will be published. The parties, and the 
Joint Council, as appropriate shall amend its provi-
sions and adjust their application as recommended by 
the review of the Agreement.
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Comment
This clause is based on the EU-Cariforum revision 
clause and declaration, and the Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and 
Investment Agreements. It envisages two steps: an 
independent human rights impact assessment, and a 
follow-up intergovernmental review (both published), 
leading to possible amendments or other action under 
the agreement.
Because different forms of action might be envisaged, 
this clause leaves it open whether appropriate action 
is to be undertaken by the parties or the Joint Coun-
cil. The Joint Council is also specifically empowered to 
take action for this purpose, which would be excep-
tional for many agreements in which the Joint Coun-
cil has no specific powers to amend the agreement.
X6. Interpretation
Joint Council
Either Party may refer to the Joint Council any dispute 
relating to the application or interpretation of this 
Agreement. The Joint Council shall ensure that in the 
application and interpretation of the Agreement 
[Article X1] is observed.
The Joint Council may settle the dispute by means of a 
recommendation. 
Comment
The EU’s trade agreements typically provide for two 
forms of dispute settlement. One is dispute settlement 
by the Joint Council, and the other is dispute settle-
ment by an arbitral tribunal. In many cases, this spe-
cial form of dispute settlement is restricted to trade 
issues, but not always. In addition, agreements con-
taining ‘sustainable development chapters’ also pro-
vide for special dispute settlement procedures for 
labour and environmental matters, in this respect fol-
lowing the procedures applicable to other disputes. In 
each case it is desirable to include a clause stating that 
all obligations must be interpreted consistently with 
Article X1.
The wording used here is taken directly from Article 19 
TEU (ex Article 220 EC), where it was the source of the 
CJEU’s original fundamental rights jurisprudence. The 
reference to Article X1 replaces a reference to ‘the law’ 
in that provision.
Arbitration panel
Any arbitration panel shall interpret the provisions 
referred to in Article Z [referring to trade obligations] 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law, including those codified in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The rul-
ings of the arbitration panel cannot add to or diminish 
the obligations set out in [Article  X1].
The original last sentence is based on Articles 3.2 and 
19.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
The sentence is technically redundant, because by def-
inition a treaty interpreter will be unable to add to or 
diminish obligations in the treaty being interpreted, as 
those depend on the interpretation in the first place. 
Nonetheless, it is usually taken as a warning against 
judicial activism and that explains its inclusion in the 
more recent of the EU’s free trade agreements. The 
revision here deletes the original (and redundant) ref-
erence to the provisions being interpreted and replac-
es it with a reference to Article X1. This is not redun-
dant, at least in those cases in which there is no 
dispute about Article X1 itself. In such cases, this sen-
tence is ineffective but also harmless.
X7. Civil society complaint mechanism
It was suggested above that a complaint mechanism 
based on the Trade Barriers Regulation be adopted to 
enable civil society to bring complaints to the Euro-
pean Commission. The detail of such procedures must 
be the subject of further discussion, but in broad out-
line what is required is a right to activate a procedure 
by which the Commission would investigate and report 
on the situation, with the possibility of taking further 
action to address the issue. Such action might involve 
unilateral action, if the issue lies with the EU, or joint 
action, or enforcement action against the other party, 
depending on the nature of the violation.
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